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REMEMBRANCE OF THINGS PAST? 
THE RELATIONSHIP OF PAST TO FUTURE 
IN PURSUING JUSTICE IN MEDIATION 
Carrie 1. Menkel-Meadow * 
The process [the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South 
Africa} was backward-looking in the sense of being expected to 
document and deal with the gross human rights violations of the 
past, but it was forward-looking in trying to prevent future 
tyranny. 
-James L. Gibson, Truth, Reconciliation, 
and the Creation of a Human Rights 
Culture in South Africa! 
Justice, after all, is the principle of mediation between people who 
are not necessarily conjoined by bonds of mutual affinity or 
shared histories, but who yet need to coexist together in the same 
society, or to negotiate their interests across national borders. 
-Eva Hoffman, AITER SUCH KNOWLEDGE: 
MEMORY HISTORY AND THE LEGACY 
OF THE HOLOCAUS-rZ 
What must be remembered and acknowledged before we can 
move forward to create a future together, whether individually or 
collectively? Or, as Avishai Margalit has recently put it, is there an 
ethics of memory3 - must some things be remembered; what can be 
forgiven or forgotten in a moral sense? I have long been worried 
about the emphasis in mediation to focus on the future, to seek 
"solutions" to problems in which the parties are guided to "move 
* Professor of Law and Director, Georgetown-Hewlett Program in Conflict Resolution and 
Legal Problem Solving, Georgetown University Law Center. This essay is inspired by the mem-
ory of the work of Trina Grillo in mediation and the experiences of my parents and relatives in 
the Holocaust, as well as the claim for reparations by former American slaves and the develop-
ment of new forms of mediative processes in Truth and Reconciliation Commissions in national 
political experiences and restorative justice in individual criminal cases. Thanks to Jonathan Hy-
man for his suggestions and to Benjamin N. Cardozo Law School of Law for inspiring this 
article. 
1 38 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 5 (2004). 
2 See generally EVA HOFFMAN, AFTER SUCH KNOWLEDGE: WHERE MEMORY OF THE 
HOLOCAUST ENDS AND HISTORY BEGINS [hereinafter "AFTER SUCH KNOWLEDGE"] (2004). 
3 See generally AVISHAI MARGALlT, THE ETHICS OF MEMORY (2002). 
97 
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forward," even while "reorienting the parties to each other,"4 in 
crafting a more productive relationship. With the growing use and 
adaptation of meditative-like processes in collective, political, and 
nation-state conflicts, as well as individualized conflicts in divorce, 
commercial, employment and criminal matters, this worry has 
grown into a larger concern about the role of the past in achieving 
justice in such settings. In this Article I seek to explore, not re-
solve, some of the issues and tensions in the role of temporality in 
achieving justice through mediative processes and to suggest some 
correctives at the practice level, as well as encourage some deeper 
thinking at the theoretical level. I focus here on issues of expres-
sion of temporality ("the past") in the "justice and mediation" 
question, not on issues of how the past should be judged - by the 
rule of law, culture, or universal human rights principles, or even 
how it can be "managed" when understandings of the past conflict 
or cannot be "resolved." I leave those bigger questions for another 
day or another writer. 
There are many descriptions and purposes claimed for the me-
diation process.5 Whether mediation is used to solve problems, 
transform parties, while acknowledging and recognizing their is-
sues with each other, settle lawsuits, facilitate legal rule-making, or 
create new entities, a large part of the ideology of mediation that 
informs its raison d'etre or sensibility is to focus on the future and 
to "make the world anew." Mediation is offered in contrast to 
more traditional legal processes, particularly adjudication, but also 
arbitration, precisely because it can craft future relationships and 
does not have to find facts, assign fault and blame, or issue judg-
ments or awards about the past. Structurally and functionally, this 
is one of mediation's defining characteristics-mediation is not re-
quired to deal with the past; it asks the parties to look to their futures 
and remake their duties and responsibilities toward each other. 6 
In contrast to mediation, adjudication, and to a lesser extent 
arbitration, require the participants to bring evidence of what hap-
pened in the past so that a third party decision-maker can assign 
4 Lon Fuller, Mediation - Its Form and Its Functions, 44 s. CAL. L. REV. 305, 327 
(1971). 
5 See generally MEDIATION: THEORY, POLICY AND PRACTICE (Carrie Menkel-Meadow 
ed., 2001). 
6 Of course, this is not the only salient characteristic of mediation. Mediation also 
promises confidentiality, privacy, creativity, direct communication, no rigid rules of evi-
dence, and facilitative, not authoritative, third party participation and leadership. And 
relevant to this Article, mediation does not require the application or use of law or any 
other laid-down principles. 
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blame and fault, and assess damages and order remediation, in 
forms of cash payments, punishments, or sometimes injunctions 
about future behavior (usually, but not always, negative), typically 
using legal or other laid-down principles such as a collective bar-
gaining agreement. For a long time adjudication has been the pro-
cess thought to provide "justice."7 This is not to say that justice 
itself is not a much contested concept, as its various forms are end-
lessly debated by philosophers and jurisprudes - should justice be 
distributive, restorative, retributive, equitable, or equal?8 Never-
theless, lawyers in particular, and some political theorists and phi-
losophers, see justice as located in the home of courts. As we here 
well know, over the years, those who have been disturbed by the 
growing use of "settlement" processes to decide cases have la-
mented, most recently "the Vanishing Trial,"9 "managerial 
judges,"l0 and the "compromised" or privatized justicell that is 
said to occur outside of courtrooms, where justice is meted out by 
an authoritative decision-maker, whether judge or jury. Even 
some within the mediation community have suggested that 
whether mediation delivers justice or not should be assessed by 
how closely mediative outcomes track those which would be or-
dered by courtS.12 I have not been among those, arguing instead 
that legal justice (as ordered by a court) is not co-extensive with 
"human" justice, and mediation can often offer a more tailored, 
particularized, and more "just" outcome (as well as process) for 
7 In the sense of application of generally agreed to principles to the specific acts of 
human wrongdoing for the purpose of reallocation of rights. whether civil, personal or 
propertied. 
8 See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (rev. ed. 1999); RONALD DWORKIN, 
LAW'S EMPIRE (1986); JURGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, (William Rehg, 
trans., MIT Press 1996). 
9 Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in 
Federal and State Court, 2003 A.B.A. SEC. LITIG. SYMP., available at http://www.abanet. 
orgimedia/dec03/120803.html. (Dec. 8, 2003); Patrick Higginbotham, Judge Robert A. Ains-
worth, Jr. Memorial Lecture, Loyola University School of Law: So Why Do We Call Them 
Trial Courts? 55 SMU L. REV. 1405 (2002). 
10 Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 376 (1982). 
11 See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L. J. 1073 (1984). 
12 See Jacqueline Nolan-Haley, Court Mediation and the Search for Justice Through 
Law, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 47 (1996); David Luban; Settlements and the Erosion of the Public 
Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619 (1995); Nancy A. Welsh, Making Deals in Court-Connected Me-
diation: What's Justice Got to Do With It?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 787 (2001); Robert J. Condlin, 
"Cases on Both Sides": Patterns of Argument in Legal Dispute-Negotiation, 44 MD. L. REv. 
65 (1985); Judith Maute, Public Values and Private Justice: A Case For Mediator Accounta-
bility, 4 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 503 (1991). 
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parties that choose to use itP As I have argued extensively else-
where, mediated solutions are not always compromises; but even if 
they sometimes are, compromises are often more fair and just than 
"winner take all" outcomes. Mediation offers the opportunity for 
participating parties to have more authentic dialogues and make 
decisions about what is fair and just to them than when an outsider 
applies rules that have been enacted by a legislature for some gen-
eralized mean, rather than for particularized human individuals. I4 
Mediative processes15 have now affected a growing number of 
legal and political processes beyond the simple dyadic dispute be-
tween two parties. Increasingly, in criminal law (victim-offender 
and restorative justice),16 in post-conflict intra-national and civil 
wars and even in international disputes, processes deploying medi-
ative approaches are being used with the hope of creating different 
forms of "justice" for the parties, including reconciliation, forgive-
ness,17 amnesty, some restitution and acknowledgment of wrong-
doing and in some cases, the creation of documented "truth" or 
records, often in more hybridized forms of mediation when used in 
mass, not individualized settings. In general, I regard this as a posi-
tive development, having recently argued that conventional forms 
of institutionalized searches for justice, in the form of courts and 
trial, are diminishing in use for a reason. They are suffering from 
evolutionary demise because they are failing to satisfy modern re-
quirements for voice, justice, and conflict resolution. I8 
Nevertheless, despite my generally appreciative and produc-
tive participation in the mediation movement, both in theory de-
velopment and in practice, I want to express some concerns in the 
hopes we might "reorient" our own process to seek more sophisti-
cated and nuanced ways to achieve justice in mediative processes. 
13 See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway? A Philosophical and 
Democratic Defense of Settlement (in Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663 (1995). 
14 See generally DISPUTE PROCESSING AND CONFLIcr RESOLUTION: THEORY, PRAC· 
TICE AND POLICY (Carrie Menkel-Meadow et al. eds., 2003). 
15 By which I mean, the use of direct party narratives of complaints, grievances, con-
flicts, disputes or wrongdoing to negotiate for recognition, remediation, restitution, recom-
pense, or some other result, with the assistance or facilitation by some third party "neutral" 
person or body. 
16 See, e.g., MARK S. UMBREIT, THE HANDBOOK OF VICTIM OFFENDER MEDIATION 
(2000); Susan M. Olson & Albert W. Dzur, Revisiting Informal Justice: Restorative Justice 
and Democratic Professionalism, 38 LAW & SOC'y REV. 139 (2004). 
17 See, e.g., MARTHA MIN ow, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HIS· 
TORY AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE (1998); ACCOUNTABILITY FOR ATROCITIES: 
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES (Jane E. Stromseth ed., 2003). 
18 See, e.g., STUART HAMPSHIRE, JUSTICE IS CONFLIcr (2000). 
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I beg the question of whether justice ought to be a concern for 
mediation, as others have articulated other values, some poten-
tially inconsistent with justice19 in the uses and practice of media-
tion. In short, peace and resolution may sometimes be more 
animating or important to the parties than total or complete justice 
or recounting of past and painful histories.20 
THE FUTURE ORIENT A TION IN MEDIATION 
THEORY AND PRACTICE 
Consider the critique of mediation made so movingly by Trina 
Grillo in The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 21 
where she outlines one of mediation's animating principles - pros-
pectivity. Citing some of the early training materials and writings 
about mediation, Grillo points out that mediators often "police" 
the acceptability of particular narratives by reminding the parties 
that "[i]n mediation the past history of the participants is only im-
portant in relation to the present or as a basis for predicting future 
needs, intentions, abilities, and reactions to decisions. "22 Early 
ground rules, especially in divorce mediation, suggested that the 
focus should be on future needs (particularly of children) and not 
to "fighting and arguing about the past,"23 which was regarded as 
unproductive, preventing agreement, and not useful for the parties. 
For Grillo, writing from her own experiences as a mediator and 
then as a divorcing parent herself, too much focus on the future 
and elimination of discourse about the past eliminated the context 
in which a particular issue, conflict, or dispute was located. As-
sumptions in mediation of prospectivity, equality of participation 
and responsibility, "controlling of emotions," espoused values of 
self-determinism and contextualism in the face of differential ex-
periences and unequal power24 all enable, in her view, a process 
19 Such rationales have included: simple case settlement, docket reduction, termination 
of harmful relationships, "cooling out" disgruntled customers, employees, and establishing 
rules and terms for ongoing relationships as in families, employment settings, etc. 
20 See, e.g., Hephzibah Levine, From a War of Olives and Pines to Agreements About a 
Park: Consensus-Based Land Use Planning in a Multi-Cultural Setting- Nahal Tzalmon, 
Israel (2004) (unpublished case study, on file with author). 
21 100 YALE L. J. 1545 (1991). 
22 JAY FOLBERG & ALISON TAYLOR, MEDIATION: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO CON. 
FLICT RESOLUTION 14 (1984). 
23 See, e.g., DONALD T. SAPOSNEK, MEDIATING CHILD CUSTODY DISPUTES (1983). 
24 Whether social, economic, political, identity-based or role-based. 
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intended to do good and empower parties, but that instead does 
great harm by cutting off experiences of past wrongs and banishing 
rights-based consciousness of legitimate entitlements. 
Grillo's work greatly influenced my own practice of media-
tion25 in critically observing how the social control and policing (in 
Foucaldian terms )26 of mediation language and practice pushes 
parties to "put aside the past" and generate "new solutions or rela-
tionships" for the future. Even the Bush and Folger model of me-
diation, focused as it is on mutual understanding and recognition, 
and not, on its terms, on case settlement, encourages parties to 
look at how they can achieve "personal growth" and achieve per-
sonal and moral "transformation." Although Bush and Folger in-
sist on "transformative" mediation's eschewing of the need to 
finally resolve or settle a matter, even their form of mediation fo-
cuses on the choices and decisions that parties will make in a medi-
ation to empower the self, while still recognizing "the Other. "27 
Mediation is still a process in which two parties (or more) in con-
flict or dispute, relate their stories, complaints or grievances and 
seek to do something about them - create a new family constitu-
tion, set up some informal guidelines for the workplace, or develop 
some new understandings about communication patterns. 
Recent treatments of mediation purposes, skills, techniques 
and processes focus more on party satisfaction while meeting un-
derlying needs and interests, wherever those needs and interests 
might come from, and also acknowledge the importance of party 
expressions of emotions as part of the mix of what is "permitted" 
in the stylized discourse of mediation. I still worry, however, that 
mediation as a process is too associated with an instrumental need 
to "move forward," whether it be in the more material aspects of 
case settlements, agreements, contracts and payments made, or in 
the more psychological realm of acknowledgment and recognition 
of the existential reality and intersubjective experience of others. 
Mediation remains an instrumental tool of propulsion into a better 
state in the future. I have no real quibble with this as an aspiration, 
as long as we take full account of and time for what else we might 
be losing in the process, if for no other reason, than to make room 
25 See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, What Trina Taught Me: Reflections on Mediation, Ine-
quality, Teaching and Life, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1413 (1997). 
26 See generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE: SELECTED INTERVIEWS AND 
OTHER WRITINGS, 1972-1977 (Colin Gordon ed. & trans., 1980). 
27 See generally ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF 
MEDIATION: RESPONDING TO CONFLICT THROUGH EMPOWERMENT AND RECOGNITION 
(1994). 
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for other things at the mediation table, such as some appreciation 
of the importance of the past. 
If we want to adapt mediation's methods of: direct narrative; 
guided communication; facilitated and mutual bargaining; empathy 
training; understanding; and mutually beneficial, tailored and crea-
tive solutions to settings as diverse as family breakdowns and na-
tional post-conflict reconciliation, we have a great opportunity to 
consider what is helpful in traditional mediation methods and what 
might be altered for different purposes. 
JUSTICE IN MEDIATION? THE PAST OR THE FUTURE? 
This is where justice comes in. Among the critiques of media-
tion processes in the last two decades have been the obvious ones 
of power imbalances,28 ethnocentric and culturally specific proto-
cols (mediation is after all a "talking cure"),29 lawless or "rights-
less" outcomes, manipulation of lay disputants by professionalized 
third parties, conflicts of interests and the absence of true neutral-
ity, diminishment if not elimination of true self-empowermeneo 
and the privatization of justice3l or its opposite - the increase of 
state control over private disputes.32 Those outside of the practice 
of the field have been most critical of how mediation might do 
right by the parties inside the process, but still harm the rest of us 
outside of a particular mediation by excluding us from participa-
tion in matters that effect the public33 through failing to elucidate 
principles or rules for the rest of us to follow or to let us see exactly 
what is going on inside the black and mysterious box of private 
conflict resolution. Add to this the use of mediation-like processes 
in such public matters as mass torts, negotiated rule-making, envi-
ronmental citings and pollution control and remediation, resource 
28 See generally Grillo. supra note 21; see also Richard Delgado et aI., Fairness and 
Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 WIS. L. 
REV. 1359 (1985). 
29 See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Many Ways of Mediation: The Transformation of 
Traditions, Ideologies, Paradigms and Practices, 11 NEGOT. J. 217 (1995). 
30 See Nancy A. Welsh, The Thinning Vision of Self-Determination in Court-Connected 
Mediation: The Inevitable Price of Institutionalization?, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1 (2001). 
31 See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 11. 
32 See, e.g., Richard Abel, The Contradictions of Informal Justice, in POLITICS OF IN· 
FORMAL JUSTICE: COMPARATIVE STUDIES (Richard Abel ed., 1981). 
33 See generally Luban. supra note 12. 
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allocation, municipal finance34 and those concerned about media-
tion raise issues at both the process and outcome level. Justice may 
demand public processes and substantively "just" or fair outcomes. 
These are all important issues, and I have weighed in on them in 
other places.35 
Given the new uses of mediative-like techniques and ap-
proaches in new processes and institutions (which I generally ap-
plaud as evidence of our evolutionary development in legal and 
conflict processes ),36 I want to reflect on how these new processes, 
like Truth and Reconciliation Commissions, with their documenta-
tion of the past "truth," teach us new lessons in the quest for justice 
in mediation. 
First, the past is an essential part of justice. 
Second, how the past is treated is an essential part of the justice 
of any dispute resolution process, including both mediation and the 
newer forms of "mediation-like" processes. 
Third, the past is no more knowable or stable than the future, so 
there are likely to be many "pasts" and "mediation-like" processes 
have both a special ability and a special disability to deal with this. 
Mediation permits several realities to "co-exist." Mediation cannot 
adjudicate or judge the past or "find a truth." It can enable relevant 
parties to "mediate" their own stories and realities of the past. 
Fourth, the past must be acknowledged and responsibility taken 
in meditative-like processes if they are to be considered legitimate 
and "just" processes. The past cannot be banished or proscribed 
from mediation. Different kinds of outcomes in such processes must 
be clearly understood - ranging from amnesty, forgiveness, restitu-
tion, restoration, recompense, and punishment. 
Fifth, mediation and various kinds of the "mediation-like" 
processes must be made more variable and accountable for their dif-
ferent purposes and to their different constituencies, including both 
those inside and outside of the processes. 
34 See, e.g., LAWRENCE SUSSKIND, THE CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK (Jennifer 
Thomas-Larmer et al. eds., 1999). 
35 See, e.g., WHAT'S FAIR: ETHICS FOR NEGOTIATORS, INTRODUCTION (Carrie Menkel-
Meadow et al. eds., 2004). 
36 See generally Menkel-Meadow, supra note 13. 
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Consider this thought experiment. Imagine if you can, that 
you are not a mediator, but a person who feels grievously wronged 
- a terminated employee, an abandoned spouse, a victim of an ur-
ban American police beating, a victim of economic, if not physical, 
discrimination in apartheid South Africa, a released political pris-
oner from an opposition party in Guatemala, EI Salvador, Chile or 
Argentina, a family member of a murdered Tutsi in Rwanda, a 
property owner in a formerly Communist regime in Eastern or 
Central Europe, a displaced resident of East Timor or Kosovo, an 
aged Korean comfort woman or a survivor of the German Holo-
caust. In any or all of these cases, whether by virtue of an over-
whelming caseload (Rwanda, East Timor, South Africa) or because 
of an innovative design for forging new governments and new 
processes (South Africa, American employment or civil rights dis-
pute panels, Rwanda) or because documentation of claims may be 
stale or unavailable (Eastern and Central Europe and Holocaust 
victims, comfort women), you are asked to participate in a commu-
nity dispute and grievance panel, an organizational mediation or 
dispute resolution program, a Truth and Reconciliation Commis-
sion hearing or a traditionally adapted community justice process, 
like Gacaca in Rwanda.37 How would you decide if you had been 
treated justly? All of these processes, recently designed, do things 
differently than courts. For example, most cannot punish, though 
some can order remuneration or compensation of some kind. 
Some offer nothing more than an opportunity to "testify" about 
wrongs done - what kind of process creates justice? 
Assessments of justice invariably involve judgments them-
selves - about process, about outcomes, and about who gets to 
make the assessments. In some of the aforementioned cases, jus-
tice is an individual matter (within a marriage); in other cases, it is 
a communal matter in which collective or group issues are impli-
cated (mass and group-based atrocities, formal unjust legal and po-
litical systems, competing property claims). In some cases the 
harm is "over" in the physical sense (relatives have died, property 
has been confiscated) even if psychic harm remains. In some cases 
harm is continuing and competition or violence may continue be-
tween conflicting groups (whites and blacks and others in South 
Africa, Serbs and Muslims in Kosovo, political regime differences). 
Do completed acts call for different processes or outcomes than 
those that might continue to be engaged or fester? What is the 
37 See, e.g., Jason Strain & Elizabeth Keyes, Accountability in the Aftermath of 
Rwanda's Genocide, in ACCOUNTABILITY FOR ATROCITIES, supra note 17. 
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obligation of a process to educate and preserve the knowledge and 
legacy of wrongdoing for those both inside and outside of the 
process? 
I approach these important questions from inside my own ex-
perience as a justice-seeking mediator with her own one-step re-
moved experience of these issues - a second-generation daughter 
of Holocaust survivors.38 Some of you may have equivalent experi-
ential bases (experiences of racial or religious discrimination of 
very profound kinds, loss of marriages, property, crime victims, di-
asporas of modern history or similar wrongs). To be a "moral wit-
ness" in Avishai Margalit's terms you must actually have 
experienced some wrong (and not just heard about it or observed it 
as I have) to get inside this question I have put before you. To 
consider what is just, or in Margalit's terms, what can be termed an 
"ethical memory," you must be directly affected by what has gone 
wrong. Grillo, in these terms, was a "moral witness" about the me-
diation process because she was not only a mediator, but she was a 
divorcing party in a mediation. I think it crucial in evaluating the 
"justice" of mediation, that we stand as much "inside" the process 
as we can, and not explain, justify or defend it from our stances as 
mediators, law professors, theorists, writers, or trainers in the field. 
I suggest that anyone inside any of these grievous wrongs 
would not be totally comfortable with a process that asked them 
only to "think of the children" or to "move forward" in the spirit of 
national peace and reconciliation or world peace. Whether testi-
mony, stories, and narratives to create a "record" of remembering 
is enough will likely vary from person to person and group to 
group, and some social science evidence suggests that it is not only 
degree of injury that affects such judgments. Even among the most 
scarred by the Holocaust, some were able to lead what others call 
"productive" lives, expressing what one writer has called a "carpe 
diem energy,"39 while others become totally disabled by painful 
memories of experiences.4o Some will want retribution, some 
38 See generally EVA HOFFMAN, LOST IN TRANSLATION: A LIFE IN A NEW LANGUAGE 
(1989); see also, e.g., HOFFMAN, supra note 2; HELEN EpSTEIN, CHILDREN OF THE HOLO· 
CAUST: CONVERSATIONS WITH SONS AND DAUGHTERS OF SURVIVORS (1979). 
39 HOFFMAN, supra note 2, at 7. 
40 Such ranges of human behavior exist in all aspects of life. Why are some poor people 
still so happy and cheerful and some wealthy people constantly depressed? Why do some 
cancer patients continue to thrive and work during painful and disabling treatments while 
others collapse, not perfectly correlated with the level of disease? See, e.g., JEROME 
GROOPMAN, THE ANATOMY OF HOPE: How PEOPLE PREVAIL IN THE FACE OF ILLNESS 
(2003). 
HeinOnline -- 5 No. 2 Cardozo J. Conflict Resol. 107 2004
2004] REMEMBRANCE OF THINGS PAST? 107 
"payment," some "righting" of wrongs to mark the losses suffered, 
both for individual relief and for human legacies to be left. In Mar-
galit's words again, "[m]ust some things be remembered?"; and if 
so, what does mediation do to erase or preserve such "ethical 
memories?" 
From a victim's (or party's) perspective what is likely most 
wanted is some sense of restoration (of self, of the moral order, of 
the status quo ante to the extent that is possible) and acknowledg-
ment by someone outside of the self (the "perpetrator" of wrong-
doing, a third party neutral, a witness) that injury has been 
suffered, that wrong has been committed. Consider the aban-
doning, but truthful, spouse who says, "I admit I did wrong, I had 
an affair, but I love another person." This is painful and causes 
harm to the spouse (and perhaps to children), but it is sadly honest 
and acknowledges wrongdoing.41 What should flow from that ac-
knowledgment remains complicated and problematic (especially 
after the elimination of fault divorce). Acknowledgment may be 
far easier in such settings of individual harm than in the larger mass 
or group harms that constitute my other examples. Traditional me-
diation can be adapted to deal with the past "injustices" of failed 
familial, commercial, or employment relationships. Mediators and 
parties can "stay with" the past longer, recounting, restating, and 
understanding both facts (establishing the "facticity" of wrongs is 
crucial to any justice process) and the more interpretive and her-
meneutic and personal meanings of those facts. Indeed, mediation 
may be especially appropriate for allowing non-evidence based 
narratives to be told, heard, repeated, clarified, and understood, if 
not "agreed to" or formally adjudicated. For many, just being 
"heard and understood" or having "voice" may be enough. In 
Margalit's interesting categorical distinctions between "ethicality" 
(what we owe those with whom we have "thick" relationships) and 
"morality" (what we owe more generalized others with whom we 
have "thin" relationships),42 ethical discourse and ethical memory 
keeping in a mediation will probably work better (if more deeply 
and thickly) than in more public or traditional settings. 
The point here is that mediators need to reorient their prac-
tices to allow, tolerate, and perhaps "structure" stories of what 
happened and the meanings of the past, rather than hurrying the 
41 I reference here the small movement to return to fault-based divorce. not only for 
financial equity grounds but for a legal acknowledgment for wrongdoing in the legal prom-
ise of marriage. 
42 See MARGALlT, supra note 3, at 7-8. 
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parties on to "future-oriented" creative problem-solving when it is 
too premature. We must not be fearful of the past, even if some 
conflicts, disagreements and arguments arise from its retelling. I 
fear that too often conflict-aversive mediators suggest the parties 
move on; "talk about the future," "talk about your plans .... ," and, 
"what would you like to see happen" are often used as a way of 
managing what they fear will be contests about the past. With skill-
ful communication and facilitation, mediation may be just the most 
appropriate place for telling narratives about the past meanings 
and hurts. Further, mediation, at least in such "thick" settings, usu-
ally, though not always, permits negotiation of restorative, restitu-
tionary, or compensatory, if not "punitive" outcomes. 
The social, political, and juridical experiments that have devel-
oped to deal with modernity's horrific mass atrocities, such as using 
some of the learning from mediation and criminal victim-offender 
processes, provide us with special opportunities for learning about 
different forms and varieties of justice. As structured to require 
acknowledgment of wrongdoing and guilt (and thus avoiding 
lengthy and sometimes inconclusive trials for fact-finding pur-
poses) as a condition for either full amnesty or lesser punishments 
or restitution, the modern Truth and Reconciliation Commissions, 
first in South Africa and now used in various forms in Central and 
South America, are exploring a more public form of "mediated" 
justice. How successful they have been in fulfilling their promise is 
beginning to be a highly contested matter,43 with some suggesting 
that with all the "truth," not enough justice has been served (pun-
ishments and exemptions). More recent efforts at creating such al-
ternative institutions have seen them as working parallel to more 
traditional prosecutorial processes with classifications and stratifi-
cations, based on severity of cases.44 
Some recently reported empirical data suggests that the 
processes of Truth and Reconciliation Commissions have impor-
tant public functions, as well as private ones. Political scientist 
James Gibson found that attitudes toward the rule of law and fair-
ness of governmental institutions retain a strong racialized ele-
ment. Blacks and coloreds (primarily ethnic Asian Indians in 
43 See, e.g., TRUTH VS. JUSTICE: THE MORALITY OF THE TRUTH COMMISSIONS (Robert 
I. Rotberg et al. eds., 2000); Ruti Teitel, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE (2000); Minow, supra note 
17. 
44 See, e.g., Laura Dickinson, The Dance of Complementarity: Relationships Among 
Domestic, International and Transnational Accountability Mechanisms in East Timor and 
Indonesia, in ACCOUNTABILITY FOR ATROCITIES, supra note 17. 
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South Africa) have less of a commitment to the rule of law than 
whites, but that participation in the Truth and Reconciliation Com-
mission, participation in the creation of the country's new collective 
memory, had a positive effect on the positions that individuals held 
about both the rule of law and the creation of a "human rights" 
culture in South Africa. 45 Gibson's findings, soon to be elaborated 
in a book, Overcoming Apartheid: Can Truth Reconcile a Divided 
Nation?46 suggest that exposure of the past abuses of human rights 
and law under the apartheid regime and the application of a seem-
ingly "universal" application of human rights principles, if not law, 
to these past abuses in a somewhat public setting fostered some 
attitude change to occur among those who participated in the pro-
cess. All elements of the process are important: exposure of past 
acts and wrongs, acknowledgment of wrongdoing, public settings, 
and participation in the process. Thus, while even some worry that 
many "offenders" did not participate47 and that many were inade-
quately punished, the very act of publicly, individually, and collec-
tively acknowledging guilt had a salutary effect on how citizens 
conceived of their new political order. Even if the kind of individu-
alized and bargained for agreements in mediation or rule-based 
court convictions do not occur, airing of and confrontation of the 
past can have some positive effects on the creation of a future 
order. 
In Truth and Reconciliation Commissions, individual agree-
ments are not "mediated" as in conventional mediations. Further, 
neither are claims adjudicated, but recitation of victims' stories of 
the past harms and injuries they suffered are documented, told and 
the national "truth" recorded. In some of the South and Central 
American Truth and Reconciliation processes families who do not 
know what happened to their "disappeared" relatives learn both 
individualized and more collective truths about the political re-
gimes that tortured and killed their family members. Repair may 
be impossible but some responsibility and "closure" may be possi-
ble and "facts" that would not emerge in a court of law may be 
exposed. Thus, more public and collectivized modifications of me-
diative processes may indeed assist in the development of new na-
tional and political cultures. Many have suggested that mediated 
45 See Gibson, supra note I, at 21-25. 
46 JAMES L. GIBSON, OVERCOMING APARTHEID: CAN TRUTH RECONCILE A DIVIDED 
NATION (2004). 
47 Such as judges of the apartheid regime. See, e.g., DAVID DYZENHAUS, JUDGING THE 
JUDGES, JUDGING OURSELVES: TRUTH, RECONCILIATION AND THE APARTHEID LEGAL 
ORDERS (2003). 
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dialogues about the past, such as facilitated meetings of second 
generation Germans and Jews48 (with no issues between them ex-
cept the past, as so many of the children of survivors have been 
repatriated through the diaspora of the World War II), will be es-
sential for any possibility of peaceful co-existence in the Middle 
East.49 Without a full airing of our past sufferings, we cannot move 
on. To suffer is human - so is to share and seek acknowledgment 
of our pain so we can move on. The pessimistic story of human-
kind is that we will destroy each other; the more optimistic story is 
the one that recognizes our resiliency and lets some, if not all of us, 
build again.50 If we have learned anything from the mass violence 
48 See HOFFMAN, supra note 2, at 268. 
49 See PROMISES (Cowboy Booking International 2001) (demonstrating the powerful 
effort to create such a "mediated" dialogue and relationship in a documentary film). The 
film raises the same issues for filmmakers as mediators - when do we actively "intervene" 
to help shape the reality we are facilitating or filming? When is "neutrality" not morally 
appropriate in our roles or justifiably violated? See id. 
50 In the words of Nobel Poet Laureate, Wislawa Szymborsk: 
After every war 
Someone has to clean up. 
Things won't 
Straighten themselves up, after all. 
Someone has to push the rubble 
To the side of the road, 
So the corpse· filled wagons 
Can pass. 
Someone has to get mired 
In scum and ashes, 
Sofa springs, 
Splintered glass, 
And bloody rags. 
Someone has to drag in a girder 
To prop up the wall, 
Someone has to glaze a window, 
Rehang the door. 
Photogenic it's not, 
And takes years. 
All the cameras have left 
For another war. 
We'll need the bridges back, 
And new railway stations. 
Sleeves will go ragged 
From rolling them up. 
Someone, broom in hand, 
Still recalls the way it was. 
Someone else listens 
And nods with unsevered head. 
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of the twentieth century it is that we must find new ways to seek 
understanding across differences. Mediation is one such way, but 
as a process, it cannot abjure the past. Even the most conventional 
mediation process must focus more on the experience of the past, 
as suffered by the parties, if they are to go forward and find new 
relationships or agreements. 
Lessons for Mediation: Recognizing the Past, Taking and Making 
Responsibility and Changing our Practices 
These new justice institutions raise important issues with re-
spect to both individual and collective harms and injuries- issues 
that philosophers have grappled with for years, but which I think 
need revisiting in light of all kinds of mediative efforts at conflict 
management, resolution, prevention and yes, containment. What is 
the relationship of acknowledgment and responsibility for harms 
caused to forgiving and forgetting? While philosophers and theo-
logians discuss the differences between "forgiving and forgetting" 
and "remembering and forgiving" or as Margalit puts it, the differ-
ences between "covering up" and "blotting out,"51 we, who partici-
pate in mediation, both as parties and as mediators, need to be 
But already there are those nearby 
Starting to mill about 
Who will find it dull. 
From out of the bushes 
Sometimes someone still unearths 
Rusted out arguments 
And carries them to the garbage pile. 
Those who knew 
What was going on here 
Must make way for 
Those who know little. 
And less than little. 
And finally as little as nothing. 
In the grass that has overgrown 
Causes and effects, 
Someone must be stretched out 
Blade of grass in his mouth 
Gazing at the clouds. 
Wislawa Szymborsk, The End and the Beginning, in WISLAWA SZYMBORSK, MIRACLE FAIR: SE. 
LECTED POEMS OF WISLAWA SZYMBORSK (Joanna Trzeciak trans., 2001). 
51 MARGALIT, supra note 3, at 191-92. "There are four different pictures of forgiveness 
in the Bible: as carrying a burden, as covering up, as blotting out, and canceling a debt. .. 
Forgiveness means overcoming anger and vengefulness." [d. 
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more mindful of what we ask parties and ourselves to do and say. 
To say such things as "we don't need to decide who is right or 
wrong to move on to a solution," or "this is not a court to assign 
blame," or "you don't have to admit anything to participate in this 
process" may contribute to the widespread perception that media-
tive processes are ones which do not provide justice, but only 
traded preferences or instrumental bargaining. To expand on what 
I think the more controversial obligations of mediation could be, 
recognition and responsibility are not just about apprehending the 
intersubjective reality of another person in interpersonal terms, but 
recognition and taking responsibility for harms caused or injuries 
delivered, whether intentionally or not.52 
When mediation is conducted in the same spirit as Truth and 
Reconciliation Commissions-seeking "truth" as well as reconcili-
ation, we can learn to forgive without forgetting; for the hurts, 
harms, and injuries we bring to mediation are real and often are 
constitutive of who we are, both as individuals and in our affilia-
tions, chosen or given, in particular identities or groups. 
Mediators' desires to remain neutral, never to assess blame or to 
call into account the responsibility of parties (which can of course 
be both or more than one )53 preserve several elements of classic 
mediation - its detached, neutral and facilitative forms. But, if the 
mediator is too passive, if the mediator excludes "past" testimony, 
if the mediator encourages the parties to "just get over it" and tries 
to resolve the problem without proper respect for their relative his-
tories, then I fear mediation will continue to have a mixed reputa-
tion, as well as fail to perform some of its most valuable functions 
of encouraging authentic encounters of human beings who seek to 
make better what has gone wrong. 
52 Without getting into it at great length here, it is useful to point out that people often 
do not want to take responsibility for harms they have "inflicted" on others. "I didn't 
intend to hurt you and 1 am sorry you feel hurt" is a common refrain. Unlike formal court 
proceedings, mediation actually allows exploration of non-intentional hurts and harms and 
lets the injurer know how the injury felt to the person injured. A skillful mediator can 
often help the injurer see his "responsibility" or the mutual responsibility for pain incurred 
(especially of the non-compensable psychological kind). 
53 1 do not mean to suggest here all harm, blame, or responsibility rests on one side 
only of any dispute. The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission explored 
the human rights violations committed by the ANC in the years leading up to the abolition 
of apartheid, and some Holocaust scholars and historians are exploring some of the acts 
Jews perpetrated on other camp victims. Obviously, in familial, commercial, and employ-
ment mediation settings, wrongful, problematic, or conflicting acts as well as breaches of 
contract, relationships, and expectations can easily happen on "both" or "all" sides. 
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Sometimes "righting a wrong" means it cannot go unacknowl-
edged or dealt with by impunity or compromise. Whether the state 
or some other public entity has to be the sole judge of wrongdoing, 
or whether those injured should have a right to determine what 
would make them whole, is precisely the question raised by such 
dispute innovations as victim-offender mediation and truth and 
reconciliation commissions. Whether communities, and other 
stakeholders, need to be invited into some mediations (children in 
divorce?) to participate in or bear witness to particular agreements, 
is a question we should be exploring in particular contexts as the 
mediation model is employed in increasingly diverse and compli-
cated settings. Whether a "record" of some mediations (contrary 
to our basic values of confidentiality) might be necessary to pre-
serve certain stories and to create important legacies for the pre-
vention of future harms is another question we should explore. 
Adaptations of the mediation process to such fora as consensus-
building meetings and negotiated rulemaking have already bor-
rowed from mediation methods, adapted for use in public settings 
for transparency, accountability, and publicity in both the process 
used and the outputs produced. Confidentiality has been modified, 
for example, when mediation-like processes are used in public set-
tings (consensus-building fora) requiring transparency and the use 
of joint fact-finding and substantive experts has sometimes modi-
fied conceptions of neutrality or truth-finding in "mediative-like" 
processes. In short, the processes themselves must be adapted for 
particular purposes. We can no more say "never the past" than we 
should say "never evaluate." 
If patterns of retribution, revenge, and vengefulness have any 
hope of being averted, there will likely have to be some public 
shaming, as well as public forgiving. Reparations, recompense, 
apology, and acknowledgment, all sometimes part of private jus-
tice, may have to be public in some cases for purposes of deter-
rence, prevention of future harms, and for individual 
accountability. Consider the tensions in promising confidentiality 
to sexual harassers in mediation sessions and victims' desires to 
have perpetrators publicly labeled simply to give notice to other 
possible victims in the workplace. 
The search for justice in some mediation settings may seem 
misplaced. Mediation is about confidential, usually individualized, 
bargained for solutions to interpersonal, contractual, or relational 
conflicts. Mediation, until recently was conceived of as primarily a 
"civil," not criminal process, with no power to punish or order. Yet 
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the power of direct dialogue between those engaged in conflicts of 
all kinds, from individual to dyadic to now even mass atrocities, 
seeking to find points of reconciliation, ways to create new rela-
tionships, as well as new governments and states, has encouraged 
the use of "mediation-like" processes in many different settings. 
As traditional mediation has served as a model for some of these 
new forms of conflict resolution, we should now look at what these 
new forms might teach us about how we should or could recon-
ceive the mediation process to meet some of the basic needs of 
parties to feel they have been justly, as well as fairly, treated. In 
the international arena, where justice must often be defined as 
broadly and non-specifically as possible, justice is often described 
as requiring the development of accurate factual records, acknowl-
edgment that basic human (or legal) standards have been violated, 
individual and governmental accountability, granting of appropri-
ate compensation, restoration of rights and property and the giving 
of apologies or creation of reconcilative acts or rituals to "repair" 
as much of the harm as possible.54 Not all mediations implicate the 
grave issues of human harm and injury that inspired the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commissions or the Nuremberg Trials, but the re-
cent engagement of the human rights movement with the conflict 
resolution movement offers much food for thought and adaptation 
of our practices at all levels. 
In my career, I have most often defended mediation against 
attacks made by the litigation romanticists who tend to see conven-
tional adjudicative processes and the "rule of law" as the only mea-
sure of justice. Mediation offers an often better process, by 
providing direct party engagement, open dialogue unrestricted by 
rigid rules of evidence and the possibilities that parties can craft 
their own solutions. To the extent that this process has all too 
often restricted discussion of the past in its promise to "move for-
ward constructively," I now think it is time for us to reconsider 
some of our dogmas and doctrines to see whether mediation is as 
adaptive and fair as we have claimed. My hope in suggesting that 
we look at constructive ways to bring the past and future together 
in mediation, both in ideology and conception and in our practices, 
is that we might then create a truly sacred place55 in mediation for 
54 See Jane Stromseth, Introduction: Goals and Challenges in the Pursuit of Accounta-
bility, in ACCOUNTABILITY FOR ATROCITIES, supra note 17. 
55 See Sara Cobb, Creating Sacred Space: Toward a Second Generation Dispute Resolu-
tion Practice, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1017 (2001)(suggesting that mediators should take an 
active role in shaping and crafting moral dialogues and responsibility in mediation, with 
reference to community values, as well as the values the parties bring to the mediation); 
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truth, human understanding, and justice to co-exist. As they say, 
without peace there will be no justice, but with no justice, there will 
be no peace. 
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, And Now a Word About Secular Humanism, Spirituality and the 
Practice of Justice and Conflict Resolution, 28 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 1073 (2001): Carrie 
Menkel-Meadow, Practicing "In the Interests of Justice" in the Twenty-First Century: Pursu-
ing Peace as Justice, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1761 (2002). 
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